V Subrahmanian, Tuesday, July 14, 2015 11:08 am

The S?tasamhit? – Part 2

The Essence of the Ch?ndogya Upani?ad 6th Chapter

10.  ??? ?????????? ??????????????? ???? ?
????? ?? ?????????? ?? ??? ?????????? ? ???

? ?? never ????????? cause-existence ?? alone ?????????? is the effect-existence ???? different ?? alone ???? if ????? then ?? that ?????????? effect-existence ?? however ??? by that ?????????? cause-existence (exists)

In this verse the view that the effect-existence is different from the cause-existence is considered and rejected. If the effect-existence is different from the cause-existence is an existent one, then there can be no way one can call the two are different from each other; they have to be the same. To explain, the existence of the pot (which is the effect of clay) cannot be claimed to be different from that of clay (the cause of the pot) and the pot-existence has to be naturally an existent one.  The clay-existence alone is what is spoken of pot-existence; there are no two different existence-s.

11.    ?????????? ?????? ????????????? ?? ????? ?
??????????? ?????? ????? ?????? ? ?? ????? ? ???

???????? as existence ?? alone ?????? different ?????? if ????????? as non-existence ?? or ????? is ????????  ??? as existence ???? then ??? one ????? existence ?????? different ? not ?? it ????? be

The explanation of the first view is covered in the previous paragraph. On the other hand, if the effect-existence is different from the cause-existence in the form of a non-existence, then…

12.     ????????? ?? ?????? ?????????? ??? ??? ?
????? ?? ??? ????? ??????????????? ???????? ? ???

????????? as non-existent ?? it ?????? is different ?????????? the effect-existence ??? from the cause-existence ??? if ????? then ?? it ? ?? never ????? existence ?????? can be ?????????? because it is non-existent ?? alone ???????? just as a void.

…..it cannot be existence at all because it is non-existence, asat, just like ‘??nya’, void, like the hare’s horn. The hypothetical case of a non-existent entity is given a few examples in philosophical discourse such as a barren-woman’s son, a sky-flower, human-horn and the hair of a tortoise. All these examples only convey us that such an object is not to be found anywhere in creation and are only mere words.

13.    ??????????????????? ? ?????? ????? ???????? ?
????????????? ? ??????? ??????? ???????????? ? ??

??? if ??????????? it is effect of non-existent ?????? admitted ? not ??????  effect ????? then ??? that ????? becomes ????????????? barren woman’s son ? not ???? ??? of anyone ??????? object’s  ??????? effect  ?????? admitted.

The existence of the effect cannot be the like of any non-existent object since such an object itself is not experienced by anyone. The proverbial barren-woman’s son is not admitted to be anyone’s product/effect.  We can very well show a child and say ‘this child’s father is a purohita.’ Any relationship, sambandha, say, between a father and a child, is possible only between two existent entities.  We cannot strike a relationship with anyone/anything that is non-existent. Hence to hold the effect-existence is that of non-existence is illogical, an impossibility.

14.    ???????????? ? ?????? ??????????????????????????? ?
?????? ???????????? ??????????? ?????????? ?
?????????????????????????? ?????? ?????????  ? ???

????????? annihilation ??? too ? not ?????? effect ?????? can be ???? its ????????? origin ????????? impossible ? not ????? existent ???????????? relation to producing some result ??????????? annihilation ?????????? O, Best of Gods ???????? just as void ??????????????? cannot be explained ??? therefore ? not ????? there ????????? origination

Can we say that the effect, k?ryam, is of the nature of ‘pradhvamsa’, annihilation? The question is based on the acceptance by the ny?ya discipline that there is a kind of abh?va, destruction, called ‘pradhvams?bh?va’, posterior non-existence, that is, non-existence post-annihilation.  When a pot is destroyed, there is the posterior non-existence of the pot. In the present context, can we admit that the k?ryam is of this type? The answer is: No. Since the annihilation, pradhvamsa, cannot originate, utpatti?, the k?ryam cannot be of this type. In other words, pradhvamsa cannot come into being.  We are talking about a k?ryam, effect, that is essentially an existent one. So, by no means can we admit of a k?ryam that is of the nature of pradhvamsa.  There is no ‘k?raka sambandha’ to pradhvamsa.  To explain: An existent object, say, clay, can be admitted to produce an effect, pot.  There is a k?raka sambandha to clay.  Pradhvamsa, being annihilation, non-existent, cannot have such a productive capacity/role. Actually, the situation of pradhvamsa, annihilation, is akin to a void, ??nya, and therefore inexplicable, just as a hare’s horn.  Hence, the k?ryam, effect, cannot be of this type.

15.    ??????????? ??????????? ??????????? ???????? ? ???

???????? non-existent ??? too ?????? difference ????? exists ???????? for the effect ??? thus ???? hypothesis  ??? if

After the objections to the status of ‘k?ryam’, effect, have been enumerated and answered, a fresh proposal is advanced: Even if the k?ryam is ‘asat’, non-existent (the proponent is arguing for a case of the k?ryam being of the nature of non-existence basically), yet there is a difference. The non-existent k?ryam is different from the case of a vandhy?putra, barren woman’s son. Hence we can establish the k?ryatvam, effecthood, of the effect. This is the proposition, to be explained and rejected in detail in the sequel.

16.    ?? ?????????? ???????? ?????????? ???? ?? ?
?????? ??? ???????? ???????????? ? ?? ?? ? ???

??  what ?????? difference ???? its ???????? relation ?????? factors ??? if ??? that ? not ?? indeed  ?????? difference ??? persisting ???????? relation ???????? relation ???? its ? it ?? alone ?? indeed

Now, the proposal stated in the earlier verse, 15, is being taken up for consideration.  What is that difference (from the case of a vandhy?putra, barren-woman’s-son)?

A.    Is it being a relation with the factor?
B.     Is it being dependent on the act of being produced?
C.    Is it being related with the existence, satt??

Since the ‘asat’ is devoid of any characteristics, nirvi?e?a, admitting that it is related to any factor is no different from admitting that to a vandhy?putra.  A vandhy?putra cannot be admitted to be a product, effect (since the cause, the vandhy?, the barren woman, cannot, by definition, beget a son).  Hence the relation has to be with an entity that is endowed with some characteristic and not a nirvi?e?a entity like a vandhy?putra. If it is replied that such a character is this very relation (the relation of the ‘son’ with the barren-woman), then the defect of ?tm??raya, dependent on oneself, will arise: the character of being a factor is dependent on the ‘son’ for being an effect of the vandhy?.

If that character is different from the above-mentioned relation, that character too has to have some specific character to inhere in the asat (since the proponent has admitted the k?ryam to be asat). Is that character:

J. the relation that was mentioned before
K. or a different character
L. or a third character

In the case of ‘J’ there is the defect of mutual dependence, anyony??rayatvam.  ‘The relation of the son with the vandhy? mother’ cannot be admitted since the cause, the mother, is dependent on the ‘son’ the effect, to be the cause, and the son, the effect, has to depend on the cause, the mother, to be the effect. Since nothing unique in the son, the effect, can be demonstrated, which has no dependence with anything other than, outside of, the effect, this is a defect.

In the case of ‘K’, the characteristics of the fourth, etc. have not been admitted, there is the defect of ‘chakrak?patti’, argument in a circle. It is like in a set of three entities, A, B and C, A depending on B and B on C and C on A. In the case of ‘L’, If the fourth, etc. are admitted, then the defect of anavasth?, infinite regress, cannot be avoided; the series of C being dependent on D, D on E, etc. will go on infinitely.

Therefore, the effect that is non-existent cannot be demonstrated to have a character of relation with the causal factor in any manner. It (the non-existent k?ryam) cannot also be admitted to be in any way different from the absolutely non-existing hare’s horn, etc.

17.    ????????????????? ?????????????? ?????? ?? ?
????????????? ???????????????? ?????? ??????? ? ???

????????????????? dependence on the act of being produced ???? if ?????? difference ???? its ??? then ??? too ?? indeed  ????????????? the aforementioned defects ??????????? accrue ???? its ? not ????? exists ??????? a solution/relief

Now the second alternative suggested in the 16th verse above: ‘B. Is it (the difference) being dependent on the act of being produced?’ is taken up for consideration.   Even this difference has to be related with some entity that is asat having a characteristic.  Otherwise there will be no difference between a human-horn (non-existent) since even a human-horn will have to be admitted to have a characteristic. [The idea is: no characteristic of any nature can be admitted to such a category consisting of human/hare-horn, vandhy?putra, etc.  All characterists/attributes can be said to inhere only in existent entities.]  Is such a difference this same ‘act of being produced’ or any other? If it is this alone, then all the defects enumerated in the previous verse such as ‘?tm??raya’ will repeat in this case too.


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